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The Capacity to Govern: A Report to the Club of Rome
 
. Yehzkel Dror. London: Frank
Cass Publishers, 2001. 264 pp. $67.00 (hardback).
 
Government’s Greatest Achievements: From Civil Rights to Homeland Security.
 
 Paul C.
Light. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. 200 pp. $19.95
(hardcover).
 
The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration for Twenty-First Century
America.
 
 Donald F. Kettl. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.
240 pp. $17.95 (paperback).
How good are our governments? What can we do to improve them? These ques-
tions are timeless and timely, as governments now have to cope with problems
that are more complex and rapidly changing than perhaps ever. These three books
seek answers to these questions. Light focuses on the U.S. government, and
emphasizes its successes; Ketll and Dror are more concerned with governments’
failings, and how to remedy them. Each book is written by an eminent scholar,
and all are well-worth reading and pondering.
As usual, Light leaves me wondering, “Why did I not think of that?” “That”
is developing a compendium of what the U.S. government has actually done well
and what it has done poorly over the past half century. His research team first
identified 50 major policy areas in which the federal government has been active,
and then polled academic historians and political scientists (450 responded) to
learn their views on the most important, difficult, and successful endeavors. The
poll is biased, of course, as the respondents are overwhelmingly white, male,
liberal, Democrats with Ph.D.s (and tenure), but the respondents do represent
those most likely to have a broad knowledge and perspective of government
performance. Light does point out when subgroups of respondents have differing
views (for example, men were much more likely than women to view “containing
communism” as an important problem), but notes that these differences do not
in general negate the consistency of the rankings. After describing the policy areas
for which the respondents found government activity most important, most dif-
ficult, and most successful, Light creates an index (as in ice-skating, the score for
each area was a weighted average of the three factors, with the highest weight
placed on performance) to rank the achievements.
It is an amazing list. In the past half century, the federal government has helped
rebuild Europe after World War II, expand the right to vote, promote equal access
to public accommodations, reduce disease, reduce workplace discrimination,
ensure safe food and drinking water, and many tasks that have immeasurably
improved social welfare. (Brief but useful capsule summaries of the greatest
achievements comprise the bulk of the book.) Light draws several lessons from
this list. Achievement—successfully taking on important and difficult tasks—does
not occur easily or quickly, but relies on endurance, consensus, and persistence.
Success is more likely when policies are coherent, when results are measurable,
when action serves moral purposes, and when there is at least a reasonable
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amount of consensus on what should be done. Light’s list is a vital reminder that
governments are not bound to fail, but can accomplish great things.
Kettl, perhaps the nation’s leading scholar of public management (PM), argues
that neither the theory nor practice of PM is up to the problems the government




, and has placed priority





that governments actually do their work. The tasks of governance have been
complicated by increasing devolution, not just to local authorities but, increas-
ingly, to nonprofit and for-profit agencies; by increasing globalization, whereby
the most influential actors are supranational bodies (the World Trade Organiza-
tion, International Monetary Fund, United Nations) and corporations without
borders; and by hyperpluralism, in which private actors demand action. Whether
facing devolution, globalization, or hyperpluralism, governmental actors must
more often negotiate with those outside (and inside) government, manage con-
tracts with external parties, and evaluate their performance, tasks outside the
traditional purview of PM.
In the concluding chapter, Kettl outlines the five main issues (challenges, capac-
ity, legitimacy, sovereignty, and public interest) that PM must face, and offers ten
principles for transforming PM: (1) hierarchy and authority cannot and will not
be replaced, but they must be fitted better to the transformation of governance;
(2) complex networks have been layered on top of hierarchical organizations, and
they must be managed differently; (3) public managers need to rely more on
interpersonal and interorganizational processes as complements to—and some-
times as substitutes for—authority; (4) information is the most basic and necessary
component for the transformation of governance; (5) performance management
can provide a valuable tool for spanning fuzzy boundaries; (6) transparency is the
foundation for trust and confidence in government operations; (7) government
needs to invest in human capital so that the skills of its workers match the jobs
they must perform; (8) the transformation of governance requires new strategies
and tactics for popular participation in public administration; (9) civic responsi-
bility has become the job of government’s nongovernmental partners; and (10)
Americans need to develop new constitutional strategies for the management of
conflict.




. Much of it comprises an intellectual history of PM,
which will be of interest mainly to devoted scholars of administration. Otherwise,
this book is the anti-dissertation: all the best material is at the beginning and end,
rather than the substantive chapters in the middle.
I am loath to criticize 
 
The Capacity to Govern
 
. Professor Emeritus Dror is smarter
than I, more widely read, and more experienced (having worked for the Israeli
government and the United Nations, and having organized policy workshops in




 to criticize the text, as I find Dror’s
aspirations for governmental reform highly attractive. Dror’s main argument is
this: to improve governments, we need a better class of citizens and leaders—
better educated, more humane, more visionary. In short, he calls for a transforma-
tion in government through a transformation in humanity. Indeed, if we all had
the education, humanity, and vision that Dror possesses perhaps the world would
be better equipped to address the world’s greatest problems.
But for of all of Dror’s clear wisdom, he seems to ignore a couple elementary
facts of politics. First, politics is rife with conflict. He seems to assume that if we
all had the virtues he espouses that we could come to agreement on what the
central political problems are and how to resolve them. I wonder, would greater
enlightenment lead to a consensus over whether market allocations are just or not,
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whether religion should play a larger or smaller role in politics, whether cultural
differences should be enhanced or suppressed, whether current needs should take
precedence over those of future generations? Dror surely has views on these
matters, but I suspect that equally wise souls will passionately disagree. What
Dror thus seems to be calling for is a particular kind of enlightenment; the one he
possesses.
Second, politics is permeated by interests and incentives. People often—not
always, but often—act strategically to obtain more of what they value. Dror seems
to hope that politicians and the public will put interests and incentives aside and
simply do what is best (as Dror sees it). Dror clearly must understand these
aspects of human nature, but he waves them aside. He claims that the public must
become more engaged and informed about politics, and that politicians must
consider broader concerns in setting policy. They might ask, “Why me? Why
should I not care more about the concerns of my family, or about the next elec-




. While as an idealist I might
agree with him, as a political scientist I cannot find this answer compelling.
MARK CARL ROM, 
 
Georgetown University
Politics and the Russian Army: Civil–Military Relations, 1689–2000.
 
 Brian D. Taylor.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 355 pp. $25.00 (paperback), $75.00
(hardback).
From the cinematic clatter of hooves on soundstage palace stairwells of July 1762,




, to the tele-
vised clank of real armored treads on Moscow’s loop highway in August 1991,
the specter of the martial figure thrusting himself into politics astride a horse or
a tank turret has been a constant feature in thinking about the character of the
Russian and Soviet state. Yet, in the important analysis of Professor Brian D.
Taylor—a political scientist of promise at the University of Oklahoma—this age-
old perceived wisdom poorly describes the reality of the soldier and the state in




 century until the beginning of this century. This
study, which spans from Peter the Great through Alexander I to Stalin, Krushchev,
and finally to Yeltsin, seeks to correct the assumptions of the previous literature




In fact, the author asserts, the absence of Praetorian soldiers and their putsches





 century until the day before yesterday. To support this thesis, Taylor
offers political scientists and scholars interested in civil–military relations theory
within comparative politics, an analysis of the role of the Russian army in domes-
tic politics and the causes for its generally apolitical and obedient posture even in
extreme internal crisis. The evidence to substantiate this assertion unfolds in five
chapters of 19 case studies. Of particular interest, the examples from the Soviet
and post-Soviet period rely on materials extracted from recently opened Russian
archives.
Military behavior in Russian domestic politics, according to Taylor, reflects a
“two-step process,” comprised, in the first instance of the opportunities for the
soldier to intervene in the life of the state (i.e., the vitality of the Russian state and
the nature of its internal crisis), and second, by norms in the officer corps as
concern the role of the soldier in politics. In this connection, the force of organi-
zational culture has generally restrained the desire of field marshals, generals, and
colonels to crash their chargers or their armored fighting vehicles through the
 138 BOOK REVIEWS
 
portals of the Kremlin and to take command. More often than not, unlike the cases
detailed in the political science literature on coups and putsches in the wider









The author takes a very circumscribed view of his topic, focusing only on direct
interventions of the military in the state—coups—rather than taking up civil–
military relations in the more general sense, as in dynastic society, the officer and
critics of the same, say, circa 1815 or the party and army as concerns the officer
corps and rank and file in 1938 or 1982. Nor does he treat the manner in which
political leaders and senior officers made key decisions of policy and strategy in
the waging of war.
Still, even in this limited expression, Taylor’s argument strikes this reviewer as
persuasive. Of course, the idea that organizational culture at arms—which is to
say, the collective experience of the officer corps, its self-image and traditions of
thought and deed, holds the key to the role of the soldier and the state in extre-
mis—represents something less than a revelation to this reviewer as an historian
of continental European civil–military relations and as a scholar, less heavily
invested in certain schools of political science theory. These are troubled times,
however, in which democratic forces in Russia appear to have endured a setback
in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s presidential regime in the mode of Charles de
Gaulle or Julius Caesar, and after September 11, 2001, the world has witnessed the
spectacle of Mars and Bellona’s return to center stage. As such, the fate of the army
in the Russian state in crisis is surely important to a critical and informed reader,
whether a student of theory or not.
A certain fluency in the theoretical discourse, to say nothing of the historical
context of Taylor’s case studies, will assist the reader of this volume. The author
appears most interested in his political science elders and peers, a reasonable
concern for a recent scholar. Thus, the novice to the subject and, perhaps, the daily
practitioners in search of an easily readable and wide-ranging account of the civil–
military relations of the Czarist, Soviet and most recent pasts must seek introduc-
tory and narrative accounts elsewhere. Similarly, those interested in the applica-
tion of civil–military relations theory to the practice of democratic civil–military
relations in the here and now—that is, a kind of how-to book of how the Russians
discarded the ideas and mechanisms of Soviet civil–military relations and have
adapted the norms of government and soldierly ethos to the world of the present
and future—may dispense with some of Professor Taylor’s theory building in
favor of the narrative sections that well describe the behavior of soldiers and
civilians in case studies of crisis in the state.
Taylor does unlimber his theory to predict the future of Russian civil–military
relations in the final pages of his book, wherein he suggests that, despite the mixed
fortunes of post-Soviet pluralism, the citizens of Russia and the newly admitted
NATO lands, need little worry about baby colonels in huge shoulder boards
catapulting Putin over the Kremlin wall in a putsch. This work thus diverges from
the more applied, nuts-and-bolts literature on Central and Eastern European civil–
military relations as has appeared in the last ten or so years of epochal change in




 Taylor offers some guidance as con-
cerns the future of security sector reform in Russia in such themes as the appoint-
ment and dismissal of senior officers; institutional barriers to officers in party
politics; the reform of military education and socialization; and a redefinition of
roles and missions.
None of this advice is at all remarkable or especially original; without doubt,
the author’s greater contribution rests in his revision of civil–military relations
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theory, in general as concerns the nature of coups. As for the generous portions
of theory in this volume, one must keep in mind that even those interested solely
in applied analysis via the all-too-promiscuous citation of “lessons learned” must
always rely on theory. Finally, Taylor’s periodization is also highly useful to the
advanced studies of students drawn from such nations as Russia, Ukraine, Mold-
ova, Georgia, and elsewhere in the lands of the ex-Soviet realm. These students
especially wish to integrate the Soviet experience into a longer historical context
which can also help them make sense of the civil–military relations here and now.
In this and more Professor Taylor’s work serves them well.
NOTES
1. This essay represents solely the opinion of the author, neither that of the U.S.
Department of Defense nor the U.S. Department of the Navy. Among a wider
literature, see the classic works of Roman Kolkowicz, 
 
The Soviet Military and
the Communist Party
 
 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press., 1967); Timothy
Colton, 
 




The Structures of Soviet
Military Politics
 
 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press., 1979); and the
more recent, William C. Fuller, 
 
Civil–Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–
1914
 










, (Bloomington IN: Indianna University Press., 1996);
Thomas Nichols, 
 
The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National
Security, 1917–1992
 
 (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press., 1993); William Odom,
 
The Collapse of the Soviet Military
 
 (New Haven CT: Yale University Press., 1998).
2. See, for instance, Andrew Cottey et al., eds., 
 
Democratic Control of the Military
in Post-Communist Europe: Guarding the Guards
 
 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002); Istvan Gyarmati et al., eds., 
 
Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned
in Europe and the U.S.
 
 (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2002); Jeffrey Simon,
 
Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil–Military Relations
 





Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy
 
. Jolyon
Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, eds. New York: Palgrave, 2003. 247 pp. $55.00
(hardcover).
The current dispute about the creation of a separate EU defense planning and
operational capability, in the wake of transatlantic disagreement over the Iraqi
war, poses the most serious threat in years to NATO and U.S.–Europe relations.
Although it was written before the Iraq war and the April 2003 meeting of leaders
from France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg that proposed the establish-
ment of a separate EU military headquarters, this book provides essential back-
ground and analysis of the trends leading to the present debate about EU defense
autonomy.
The eleven chapters of this edited volume are contributed by a collection of
European and North American experts, and presented in four parts. Following an
introduction by the editors, the three chapters in Part One examine the develop-
ment of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) since the 1990s. While
Alexander Moens argues that the formation of a concrete European military
capacity will take many years, Terry Terriff claims that NATO’s Combined and
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Joint Task Forces (CJTF) arrangement will not provide sufficient autonomy for the
EU to satisfy its long-term security goals and needs. Frédéric Bozo discusses the
considerable impact of the Kosovo war on the development of ESDP. He argues
that a strategic rebalancing in transatlantic relations is necessary, and this requires
a more capable and assertive Europe.
The two chapters in Part Two discuss the military “capabilities gap” that
became so apparent in the Kosovo war. David Yost writes that the persistence of
this gap could lead to an unhealthy U.S.–EU division of labor in security affairs
that could fuel transatlantic tensions in the future. Kori Schake argues for a
“constructive duplication” of military capabilities as the best way to achieve
greater equality in the alliance and assure the continued survivability of NATO.
The discussion in Part Three shifts to NATO enlargement and its implications
for ESDP and NATO–EU relations. Sunniva Tofte examines the problems that
ESDP poses for non-EU NATO members, Turkey and Norway, and the problems
these countries (especially Turkey) create for ESDP. In their separate chapters, both
Mark Webber and Julian Lindley-French discuss the dilemmas of NATO enlarge-
ment, including problems stemming from the imperfect overlap of EU and NATO
membership and threats to NATO’s effectiveness. Any decrease in NATO’s effec-
tiveness as a result of enlargement, Webber argues, may push the EU to become
more independent in defense matters.
The book’s final part consists of two chapters that make quite different argu-
ments about the desirability of a stronger and more autonomous ESDP. In his
chapter, Anand Menon claims that efforts to strengthen ESDP and give it greater
independence from the U.S. and NATO are both “misguided and dangerous”;
these efforts will not work, European governments will not pay for them, and
they will lead to U.S. disengagement from Europe. Far better, according to Menon,
would be for the EU to develop its “soft power,” where it has a comparative
advantage, and strive for an effective security division of labor with the U.S. and
within NATO. This argument is firmly rejected by Jolyon Howorth, who asserts
that an autonomous ESDP is inevitable, the result of both endogenous (to the EU)
and exogenous historical forces (global strategic developments and U.S. policies).
While he acknowledges that ESDP faces many institutional, political, and financial
challenges, Howorth confidently predicts that these will be overcome, because
they must.
The Menon chapter is a bit of an “outlier,” and may have been included as a
counterbalance to the dominant consensus in this book, which is more accurately
represented by Howorth. Despite some disagreements among the contributors
about how quickly or easily this can be achieved, the predominant view is that
greater European autonomy in defense affairs is both inevitable and desirable. It
is even more interesting that this conclusion was reached before the crisis in
transatlantic relations created by the Iraqi war and the current debate about a
separate EU military headquarters (conducted within the intergovernmental con-
ference that is discussing a new constitutional treaty for the EU). But this indicates
what is important and useful about this book. The current ESDP debate did not
suddenly emerge in the past year out of disagreements over Iraq, but instead has
deeper roots in longer-term trends and developments. It is these trends and
developments that are examined and analyzed in this book.
If there is one glaring omission in this book, it is the inadequate treatment of
the impact of the EU’s impending enlargement on ESDP. The current push of
France, Germany, and several other EU member states for a stronger ESDP
(through the mechanism of “enhanced” or “structured cooperation” that is being
discussed in the intergovernmental conference; this would allow a smaller group
of countries to push ahead with greater defense cooperation within the EU) has
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also been stimulated by fears that enlargement will make closer cooperation and
further political integration impossible. The threat posed by enlargement to ESDP
and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was highlighted by the
divergence of Poland and other incoming member states from the Franco-German
position on Iraq, but its existence was recognized long before this. It is surprising
and disappointing that this issue was not given more attention in the book.
Overall, this book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the
debate about ESDP and European defense autonomy. The chapters fit together
nicely into a coherent whole, and the scholarly quality of the various contributions
is generally high. Some chapters are more technical (and jargon- and acronym-
filled), and hence less readable, than others. But overall, it is a well written and
accessible volume that should be of interest to general readers as well as experts,





Migration and the Externalities of European Integration
 
. Sandra Lavenex and Emek




Migration and the Externalities of European Integration
 
, editors Sandra Lavenex
and Emek M. Uçarer, and their contributors offer an innovative look at the Euro-
pean Union (EU). The EU’s slow, yet continued, move toward a common migra-
tion and asylum regime has generated a great deal of scholarship on its impact
on the member states. We know little about the impact of this development on
nonmember states.
The authors seek to redress this shortcoming, and draw on two bodies of
literature. The first is that typically associated with the impact of EU policies on
member states, “policy diffusion, lesson drawing, and policy transfers” (3). The
second, borrowed from economics, is the notion of externalities, which makes it
possible to “denote the positive or negative, intended or unintended, external
effects on third countries, international organizations and adjacent policy fields.”
The editors list three groups of countries examined: (1) the inner circle (Norway
and Switzerland); (2) the Central and Eastern European accession countries
(CEECs); and (3) the Mediterranean countries. Additional chapters focus on the
EU’s impact on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the
extent to which the EU’s trade agreements include immigration or asylum com-
ponents. Two chapters examine the consequences of the migration regime on the
member states’ welfare and citizenship policies.
In chapter 1, Uçarer provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of
the EU’s immigration and asylum policies, from Schengen to the subsequent
intergovernmental developments, concluding with the communitarization of
immigration and asylum. Brochman and Lavenex deal with Switzerland and
Norway, and their findings are mixed for the book’s main argument. They find








policies per se. Turning to Switzerland, the authors argue that it was the first to
apply the “notion of safe countries of origin to asylum seekers” (64). Although
the point is not noted, it indicates that the causal arrows may not point in the
same direction as the editors would have us believe. Rather than EU policies being
the basis of its neighbors’ immigration policies, it may be, as is the case here, the
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opposite. They conclude by highlighting not the importance of the EU, but rather
the “similar problem structures” faced by the EU, Switzerland, and Norway,
which explains their similar policies.
Jileva finds that the requirement made of the CEECs that they adopt the EU




 has translated into a marked deterioration of
relations with their eastern neighbors. This in turn conflicts with another EU
requirement made of its future members, that of peace, stability, and good neigh-
borly relations. In chapter 5 Grabbe looks at Hungary and Poland, but reaches
essentially the same conclusions, and it is unfortunate that the editors did not
merge the material into a single chapter rather than allow for this repetition.
Turning to Mediterranean countries in chapter 6, Pastore concludes that a lack
of interest on the part of the EU makes it impossible to draw “any serious inference
on the externalities of EU integration” (119). In chapter 7, Kirici argues that Turkey




 since it became an official
candidate for EU membership in 1999, particularly in the field of asylum. The
outlook seems bleak, as he argues that Turkey is “neither bureaucratically/orga-
nizationally nor socioeconomically . . . ready to carry out these tasks” (131).
Chapters 8 and 9 explore the degree to which the EU’s immigration and asylum
regime has been incorporated in its foreign and trade policies. That they come
near the end of the volume is peculiar, given that they both expand on the
theoretical underpinnings of the case for EU externalities.
In spite, or perhaps because, of its ambitious goals, 
 
Migration and the External-
ities of European Integration
 
 suffers from a number of shortcomings. The theoreti-
cal framework outlined by the editors at the onset is absent from the case studies
that come between the introduction and conclusion. While some contributors
succeed in identifying externalities, there is no truly unifying thread that brings
the chapters together. Furthermore, it is not always clear if the externalities
should be attributed to the EU, its member states, or simply the similarity of
external migration pressures faced by European countries. In their conclusion,
Uçarer and Lavenex argue that “greater geographic proximity to the EU”
accounts for the “degree of interdependence with the EU migration regime”
(212). But the differences in interdependence are clearest between candidate and
noncandidate countries, while this obviously follows geographical proximity, it
need not be the case.
Responsibility for the other problems should be laid at the feet of the editors.
Many of the chapters go over previously covered ground—there are too many
“reminders” of EU developments of which we are reminded more than once. The
introduction announces “four groups of countries or regions” but presents three
(as does the book’s summary on the back cover). It is only in the final chapter that
we learn of the fourth group: countries that have concluded less encompassing
external agreement with the Union. This last group is a rather eclectic one (essen-
tially, the so-called ACP countries [Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific Group]) and
they receive only the most cursory analysis. Finally, the chapters on the European
welfare states (Geddes) and “the impact of immigration on conceptions of citizen-
ship” (Brochman) contribute little to the stated objective of the book. Neither deals
with the externalities as defined by the editors, and that they receive one scant
paragraph on the final page in the editors’ summary only serves to make their
presence even more conspicuous. Taken individually however, the contributors
bring new and interesting insights on the impact of the EU’s immigration and
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Government: A Public Administration Perspective
 
. Jos C. N. Raadschelders. Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. 464 pp. $39.95 (paperback), $ 79.95 (hardcover).
American public administration has been insulated from, or has insulated itself
from, developments occurring in other parts of the world. Comparative public
administration, a flourishing discipline several decades ago is seeing a resurgence
only now. Developments outside our borders have transformed our discipline
dramatically. Even though many of us who have taught in the field have used
academic approaches that have blended many of the contributing disciplines to
public administration—much of our instruction still lacks an international dimen-
sion. Raadschelders, a Dutch scholar, has offered the discipline a much-needed
textbook that approaches public administration in a multifaceted sense: one that
is embedded in its respective constitutional and national context, responsive to
the changes in the management practices of the field, the changes in society, and
a theory-rich tradition that can draw from a multitude of governance experiences
in Europe and the United States.
On the surface, the book covers the traditional canon of public administration
texts. But there is a twist. Raadschelders’ European roots challenge the traditional
instrumentalist tradition of many contemporary American public administration
texts. The book’s holistic and multidisciplinary approach to government and
public administration is intended to be more than a “bookcase framework” (373).
Raadschelders contends that academics who are pursuing administrative matters
either for the sole purpose of theory, or for managers who follow every latest fad
are likely to fail both their students, their citizens, and their professions. Public
policy makers, bureaucrats included, must ask fundamental questions about who
governs, whose interests are represented, and what mechanisms are used to bal-
ance the various interests. The book thus serves to bridge “the gap between the
more theoretical philosophy of government (political theory, etc.) and the more
applied Public Administration literature (specialized, focused on techniques and
instruments)” (31). Raadschelders approaches his task utilizing four different, but
related challenges to governance. The first considers a society’s need to balance
“individual and collective desires.” The second examines the implications of jurid-
ical (the formal constitutional base) and sociological traditions of public adminis-
tration (with its emphasis on the dynamic relationships between formal and
informal rules, and the roles of various actors in the policy process). The third
element of his framework highlights the effects of political cultures and traditions
on the functions and structures of government in a society. Finally, Raadschelders
considers government and governance in their temporal continuum and the atten-
dant need for a continuous rebalancing of the value frameworks that assign
differential roles to public and private actions/actors. Raadschelders does not
consider the four elements of his framework as dichotomies but as continua that
also mutually reinforce each other.
The book lays out these arguments in four parts. Part I examines the shifting
justifications for the need of government in societies. Part II discusses the institu-
tional superstructure, such as democratic, legal, and federalist traditions whose
mix evolves different governance arrangements. Topics in Part III are most famil-
iar to many U.S. readers and cover public management traditions, organizational
theories, or decision-making approaches. Part IV now moves the reader to the
individual actor level: the roles of political and appointed officeholders, citizens,
and other stakeholders. In the conclusion, Raadschelders reiterates the need for a
holistic and multidisciplinary approach to governance that transcends the prefer-
ence for “instrumentalist and technocratic” traditions of the past, especially in its
 144 BOOK REVIEWS
 
American context. He proposes a meta-framework (374) that combines all four
challenges to governing embedded in their ideational, institutional, organiza-
tional, and individual traditions.
The book is well suited as a text for beginning graduate students in political
science and public administration, especially those with little prior course work
in the field. However, it is not an easy read. As Raadschelders says himself, “it
does not provide ready-made answers to complex questions” (31) but rather
challenges the teacher and student alike to engage some fundamental questions
about the purposes and values of our work, both as academics and students, as
well as practitioners. It further functions as a reference frame to link the divergent
courses and specializations in a Master of Public Adminstration program. It is also
an excellent primary text for courses that are structured around cases (to accom-
pany, for example, Stillman’s popular case book). Instructors desirous of exposing
their students to a more varied theoretical diet also will find this text suitable. It
allows them to discuss with their students the various governance traditions in
western settings, their impacts on approaches to governing, and the occasional
misunderstandings that arise as Americans move outside their familiar reference
frameworks.
Raadschelders challenges his readers to be cognizant of their own philosoph-
ical and governance traditions without which, mindless instrumentalism remains
the only choice as we chase every latest management fad in hopes for a quick
solution to problems that defy easy fixes.
MARGARET F. REID, 
 
University of Arkansas






Lisa Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 158 pp. $27.50
(cloth).
Lisa Anderson, dean of Columbia University’s School of International and Public
Affairs, begins this book by observing that in the aftermath of the September 11
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, Americans had two desires—to under-
stand and to act. Since that event, she posits, we have learned how intimate and
fragile are the connections between social science (understanding) and public
policy (acting). Such an assertion anticipates and seems supported by, for exam-
ple, recent controversies regarding the knowledge base underpinning “nation-
building” policies in Iraq.
Dean Anderson’s thesis is that the public policy–social science linkage is char-
acterized by “repeated oscillations,” featuring a good deal of tension and ambi-
guity. On the one hand, social scientists are attracted to the exercise of power—
taking active roles in the making and implementation of public policies. Even
though being an active participant in the policy process means entering a world
where academic rigor and theoretical elegance is often a low priority, it is seduc-
tive to have the opportunity to apply research, make an impact, and be able to
modify knowledge in “real world” contexts.
On the other hand, social scientists are fascinated with pursuing truth for its
own sake. The attractiveness of this path is the possibility that their academic
disciplines can become neutral bastions of scientific objectivity, modeled after the
“hard” sciences, where enormous prestige resides with the “basic” research enter-
prise. Here, the impulse is to disregard all application, including that which might
be policy relevant, in favor of the “value-free” pursuit of knowledge.
 BOOK REVIEWS 145
 
History shows that the pendulum has swung back and forth between the two




 century), government seemed likely to dom-
inate the career paths of those who pursued academic degrees in the new social
science disciplines. For example, when Columbia University created the first
graduate school of political science in 1880, the program of studies was designed
to prepare graduates for careers in the civil service. But it turned out that many
of the jobs for these new social scientists would be found not in government but
in the rapidly expanding higher education field (e.g., in the land grant universi-
ties). New academic disciplines and professional associations were not far behind.
Led by economics, these disciplines quickly sought to become more scientific—to
seek universal truths—funded by another newcomer to the American scene, the
large private foundation (e.g., Carnegie, Rockefeller).
The Great Depression and World War II sent the pendulum speeding the other
direction. Federal government funding for academic research expanded dramat-
ically, and large numbers of university faculty and graduates took jobs in the host
of new public sector programs. This pattern persisted into the postwar period
(largely because of the Cold War), but was brought to a screeching halt by events
beginning in the early 1960s.
The Vietnam War, Civil Rights Movement, Watergate, and other events did
substantial damage to the image of public service—especially on America’s cam-
puses. In response, academic social scientists turned inward, rescued once more
by the resurgent private foundations. The Ford Foundation was especially impor-
tant, helping to establish several new schools of public policy (e.g., the John F.
Kennedy School at Harvard, the Haas School at University of California–Berke-
ley). These new schools were supposed to strike a balance between truth and
power, but it has proven to be an uneasy truce that has pleased few parties at
interest. For example, the new schools have been characterized as having curricula
(e.g., applied policy analysis) that are less rigorous than the social sciences.
Nonetheless, by the 1990s, these disputes seemed to be taking a back seat to
the complete emergence of the U.S. as the world’s only superpower. Models of
almost everything American—including social science and public policy—were
being snapped up around the world, defects and all. From Russia to Vietnam, and
from South Africa to Mexico, U.S. experience helped shape social science and
public policy almost across the board. What could possibly alter this “moment of
triumph”?
This is the part of the book that is most impressive. Anderson asserts that in
the world today there are two forces that have begun to destabilize, once again,
the delicate relationship between truth and power. Privatization is the first and
globalization is the second.
Privatization refers to the market beginning to compete with the state as the
locus and source of public policy. For example, the proliferation of private military
firms seemed to some observers to signal the beginning of the end of perhaps
government’s final monopoly. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sprouted
up everywhere. Think tanks and policy advocacy organizations, doing research
that was very different from that provided by universities, began to occupy center
stage in debates that previously had been the sole or primary turf of government
agencies. Often these NGOs engaged in highly partisan advocacy, abandoning
any pretense of neutrality. Policy was being made in more places, by a wider range
of actors.
Not only did these new organizations enhance the diversity of employment
opportunities for the graduates of American universities (including the schools of
public policy), they also populated a marketplace increasingly familiar with social
 146 BOOK REVIEWS
 
science theories, methodologies, and findings (e.g., political polling, economic
statistics). Social science was being diffused around the world in ways that raised
questions about what was unique about the capabilities and knowledge of aca-
demic social scientists.
Perhaps more significant for the long term, privatization seemed to be chang-
ing the nature of the scientific enterprise itself. Perhaps the best-known formula-
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information presented to the scientific community be assessed independently of





defines property rights to knowledge by requiring that all scientific knowledge





, which requires researchers to pursue scientific knowledge without consid-




, which emphasizes the
need to never take results on faith or trust—requiring instead constantly critical
views (being open-minded, impartial, and self-critical) of its practitioners (Mer-
ton, 268–278). Each of these scientific norms is being changed by privatization.
Secrecy and the proliferation of property rights are the enemies of communal-
ity, yet this is precisely what privatization has generated. The proliferation of
political advocacy organizations and fora has blurred the boundary between
scientific knowledge and mere political argument, to the detriment of standards
of organized skepticism or disinterestedness. Indeed, there seems to be a decline
in the expectation that science for policy will be neutral. Similarly, the use of
universal (preestablished, impersonal) criteria to assess science seems to be erod-
ing. Faced with multiple, competing sources of science and policy, consensus on
such criteria is increasingly difficult to reach.
Coevolving with privatization is globalization. Social science has been
exported around the world, diffused by international networks of colleagues
increasingly engaged in cross-regional and cross-national research. It has become
commonplace for social scientists to be employed in international nongovernmen-
tal organizations. At the same time, however, the private, international market for
social research is now largely unregulated. Among the negative consequences of
these trends is a widespread concern about the declining credibility of the social
science enterprise. Even efforts to understand globalization itself seemed to suffer.
Anderson quotes Joseph Stiglitz as arguing that all too often International Mone-
tary Fund policy was being made by “a person who stayed in a five star hotel for
a few weeks looking at some data.”
Taken together, these trends seem to suggest that it is now more difficult to
argue that truth is separable from power. Nonetheless, Anderson believes there is
still hope. She argues that more than ever before, universities—and particularly
the policy schools—must “construct and protect arenas for debate dissent, and
dispute.” A starting point, she suggests is becoming familiar with the “the peculiar
history of social science and public policy itself.”
This book is a good starting place for such discussions. It will be of most
interest to academic social scientists with a policy bent, and their graduate stu-
dents. Policy makers likely won’t read it, but they should.
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